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After about 40 years of evolutionary modelling of cultural dynamics, many research-
ers feel that we still do not have something like a full-fledged theory of cultural evo-
lution. This concern is, of course, legitimate; but just a few authors have attempted 
to provide a diagnosis of why this is so. What kind of phenomena should an evolu-
tionary theory of culture explain? What kind of explanation should this theory offer? 
What kind of formal tools are the most appropriate to represent cultural processes? 
Should an evolutionary theory of culture employ formal tools at all? These are all 
questions that have been answered in many, frequently contrasting, ways.
The reasons why a full-fledged theory of cultural evolution has not been 
attained yet are not, however, to be exclusively imputed to the disagreements 
between practitioners. As Love and Wimsatt mention in the introduction of 
Beyond the Meme, culture is indeed a “beast”, apparently untameable from a 
conceptual and theoretical point of view. The variety of facets usually associated 
with the term “culture” (e.g., behaviours, artefacts, social environment, institu-
tions etc.) makes it difficult to even represent what is at stake in an evolution-
ary theory of culture—let alone to explain it. Nonetheless, according to the edi-
tors of the book, this should be no reason to despair. As a matter of fact, Beyond 
the Meme can be considered as a remedy against the scepticism surrounding the 
possibility of an evolutionary theory of culture. We should not delude ourselves 
though: the road to a conceptually satisfactory and empirically accurate theory of 
cultural dynamics is still long.
In order to properly target our theoretical efforts, we should first of all clear the 
field of some obstacles. The main critical target of Beyond the Meme is, as the name 
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of the book suggests, a notion of culture as a highly atomisable phenomenon. This 
perspective, more commonly associated with memetics (Dawkins 1976), is to a cer-
tain extent shared by one of the most successful research programmes in cultural 
evolution, that is, dual-inheritance theory (Boyd and Richerson 1985). Although 
this approach is not disregarded by the editors of the book (on the contrary, in some 
cases, it is implicitly endorsed; cf., for instance, Chap. 7 by Marshall Abrams), most 
contributors agree on the need of complementing it with a somehow more “holistic” 
view of cultural processes. The overarching framework suitable to integrate exist-
ing cultural evolutionary models into a more realistic picture of cultural change and 
accumulation is mainly provided by Wimsatt in the first chapter of the book.
Wimsatt (relying on some of his previous works; see, especially, Wimsatt and 
Griesemer 2007) focuses on the structural aspects of cultural phenomena rather than 
on the dynamical ones, as many practitioners in cultural evolutionary theory usu-
ally do. As a matter of fact, it is just by making explicit all the factors making pos-
sible the origin and maintenance of cultural phenomena that we can hope to depict 
them without excessive idealisations (which, although frequently helpful, may easily 
result in an oversimplification of the object under study). Structural factors entrench 
cultural dynamics, in the sense that they control what sort of evolutionary pathways 
are, in a certain moment, effectively available and what are not (one may think about 
structural factors as the factors underpinning and shaping a complex adaptive land-
scape for cultural phenomena).
Wimsatt distinguishes between two main kinds of structures entrenching the 
emergence and evolution of specific cultural phenomena, that is, “internal” and 
“external" structures. The internal structures are chiefly related to the development 
of the cognitive skills needed to learn complex behaviours and technologies such 
as the ones typical of human societies. The external structures, on the other hand, 
identify demographic or institutional factors influencing the diffusion of cultural 
skills and technologies at a population level. The two different kinds of structures 
are deeply interconnected, and it is difficult, when the explanation of a cultural phe-
nomenon is at stake, to clearly discern to what extent each one is contributing to the 
overall process.
The strategy Wimsatt suggests in order to attempt to disentangle such a complex 
picture is to identify the way in which different factors scaffold the cultural process. 
The notions of scaffold and scaffolding are, indeed, central to virtually all the con-
tributions contained in the book (see, in particular, Chap. 4, by Michael Janssen, 
and Chap. 8, by Gilbert Tostevin). Although the use of this concept is not always 
uniform among the authors, in very general terms we may characterise a scaffold as 
a condition—or, better, a set of conditions—that have to be present to allow certain 
processes to be properly instantiated. The notion of scaffolding applied to cultural 
evolution emphasises that cultural processes are typically the result of many mutu-
ally dependent and multi-layered conditions (this is especially evident in the case 
of the evolution of language; see chaper 9, by Salikoko Mufwene, and Chap. 10, by 
Massimo Maiocchi).
In accordance with the distinction between internal and external structures, it is 
possible to distinguish between factors scaffolding (both biologically and socially) 
individual learning skills and factors scaffolding the institutions promoting (or 
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undermining) the diffusion of such skills and of the technologies resulting from the 
diffusion of such skills.
At the level of the individuals, we are confronted with a variety of developmental 
constraints that may severely bias the way in which cultural information is assimi-
lated and transmitted. Tostevin (Chap. 8), an experienced archaeologist, provides a 
nice illustration of the importance of taking into account such constraints. Tradi-
tional evolutionary models of flintknapping techniques during the Palaeolithic tend 
to infer knowledge about the technological skills of the crafters exclusively from the 
finished artefacts. Nonetheless, the learning of flintknapping techniques involves an 
array of different (cognitive, manual, social) complex skills, which cannot be fully 
appreciated if we do not consider more carefully also the way in which the crafters 
are encultured.
The emphasis on the individual developmental scaffolding is intended, among 
other things, to provide a more solid framework for the study of the diffusion dynam-
ics of cultural traits. In this respect, Wimsatt introduces the notion of transmissible 
or replicable elements (TREs) in order to characterise cultural transmissible items 
(artefacts, practices, ideas etc.). TREs are supposedly different from memes inso-
far as they are not autonomous, self-replicating entities, but rather part of complex 
arrays of elements conditioning, in their turn, individual learning strategies. The 
deep interconnectedness between developmental constraints and TREs diffusion is, 
in Wimsatt’s view, an aspect differentiating the overall outlook defended by many 
contributions in the book and the one advocated by dual inheritance theory, which 
would support a much stronger analogy between cultural transmission and genetic 
inheritance.
In this sense, the conceptual framework here proposed certainly contributes to 
the formulation of more sophisticated models of cultural transmission, as attested 
by Foster and Evans’ chapter (Chap. 5). The two sociologists observe that horizon-
tal transmission (that is, from peer to peer) of cultural information is ubiquitous 
in modern societies. This difference with respect to genetic inheritance, which is 
typically vertical (that is, from parents to offspring), albeit not unnoticed, has not 
received the sufficient attention. In particular, it is not properly accounted for by tra-
ditional phylogenetic approaches. In order to rectify this situation, Foster and Evans 
elaborate a reticulate model of cultural transmission and test the effects of multiple 
“parents” on the emergence of cultural novelties (the role of multiple “parents” on 
the emergence of scientific novelty is also one of the topics of Chap. 4, by historian 
of science Michel Janssen).
While I find the attempt to better integrate developmental factors into the dynam-
ical models of cultural evolution certainly admirable, I am not sure that this is some-
thing that cannot be done within more traditional approaches to cultural evolution, 
like dual-inheritance theory. If the difference between TREs and Boyd and Richer-
son’s cultural variants is that the distinctive conceptualisation of TREs makes them 
more dependent on specific developmental processes involved in their transmission, 
then the difference is just of degree. As a matter of fact, during the last decades, also 
dual-inheritance theorists have increasingly attempted to integrate developmental 
factors with evolutionary ones. As testified by recent works (see, for instance, Ken-
dal et al. 2018), one of the main points of cultural evolutionists’ agenda is to refine 
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our understanding of the cognitive biases involved in the transmission of cultural 
variants, so as to provide a more realistic picture of the diffusion of specific cultural 
skills or technologies (see also Heyes 2018).
An aspect that, on the contrary, has received far less attention by cultural evolu-
tionists is the scaffolding provided by external structures. Although, as a matter of 
fact, models accounting for population-level constraints on cultural evolution have 
been proposed—such as those formulated within niche construction theory (Odling-
Smee et al. 2003) and cultural group selection (Wilson 2019)—, these do not fully 
explore the implications that institutions have on individual development. A full 
understanding of these implications involves a distancing from a purely biological/
evolutionary point of view, to incorporate results from those areas that tradition-
ally have studied the relation between institutions and their material realisations 
and effects, that is, the social sciences. In this sense, the proposal supported by the 
authors of Beyond the Meme positively contributes to the realisation of a goal fre-
quently magnified, but rarely attained: the construction of a productive and equili-
brate debate between cultural evolutionists and social scientists.
This interplay between disciplines is nicely illustrated in a variety of ways by 
many chapters of the book. For instance, Sabina Leonelli (Chap. 2) and Nancy 
Nersessian (Chap. 3) investigate two ways in which scientific practices are made 
possible by, respectively, the constitution of social organisations and laboratories. 
Joseph Martin (Chap. 11) shows how institutionalised technologies may scaffold 
specific skills through the introduction of public policies. Paul Smaldino (Chap. 12) 
assesses some attempts of accounting for the phenomenon of social identity (espe-
cially from the perspective of cultural group selection theory) and proposes to com-
plement them through a study of the organisational networks that arise in modern 
societies.
Many contributions in the book are exploratory in their nature, in the sense that 
they aim to emphasise the complexity of the phenomena of scaffolding in cultural 
evolution rather than put forward well-defined models to encompass such a com-
plexity. Two notable exceptions, in this sense, are the works of Mark Bedau (Chap. 
6) and Andersson, Törnberg and Törnberg (Chap. 13). Both chapters are focused 
on methodological questions, although these are approached in distinct ways. Bedau 
calls attention on the fact that in cultural evolutionary theory, just as in evolutionary 
biology, it would be extremely fruitful to work with analogues of “model organ-
isms”. Bedau argues that patents are good candidates as “model cultural systems”. 
As a matter of fact, they are an example of a cultural phenomenon of which we have 
a complete record, well-organised and full of standardised information about the 
inventors and the characteristics of the innovations. From this information, Bedau 
infers some interesting hypotheses about the phylogeny and dynamics of patents.
Andersson and his collaborators close the book with some more general con-
siderations about the proper conceptualisation of cultural processes. On their view, 
social systems cannot be just conceived as complex systems (in which new dynam-
ics emerge from the aggregative interactions between the components of the sys-
tem) or as “complicated” systems (in which dynamical processes are the result of 
the interplay between the distinct levels that make up the system). They rather con-
stitute a different kind of systems—which are both complex and complicated but, at 
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the same time, not fully reducible to these interpretative categories—that the authors 
call wicked systems. In wicked systems, the difficulty to make predictions is due to 
the entanglement between levels and to the effects of the environment that continu-
ously produces changes in the structures under study, making them poorly decom-
posable. New conceptual approaches and formal tools must be ideated in order to 
properly deal with this characteristic kind of systems.
Overall, Not by Memes alone is a challenging but extremely rewarding reading. It 
is challenging because culture—as Love and Wimsatt say—is a “beast” that can be 
attacked from a variety of standpoints. To fully understand the individual strategies 
deployed by the authors of the book requires not just some preliminary knowledge 
of Wimsatt’s interpretative framework, but also competences in the many specific 
scientific fields called to participate in this collective effort. Once the reader, none-
theless, accepts the difficulty of the task at hand and acknowledges that the topic of 
cultural evolution must by approached, above all, with intellectual humility, she will 
discover in the pages of this book a rich collection of case studies, original ideas and 
thought-provoking questions.
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